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Abstract:  
We investigate the dramatic 2008-2009 trade collapse using microdata from a small 
open economy, Belgium. Belgian trade essentially fell because of reduced quantities 
and unit prices, rather than fewer firms involved in international transactions, fewer 
trading partners per firm, or fewer products traded. Our difference-in-difference results 
point to a fall in the demand or tradables – especially durables and capital goods – as 
the main driver of the recent collapse. Finance and involvement in global value chains 
player only minor roles. Firm-level exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates – as 
well as exports-to-production and imports-to-production – ratios reveal a comparable 
collapse of domestic and cross-border operations. Access to credit affected both types 
of activities to the same extent. Overall, our results point to a general fall in demand and 
not a crisis of Belgian cross-border trade per se. 
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1 Introduction
World trade in manufactures fell by about 30% in nominal terms between the first quarter of 2008 and
the second quarter of 2009 (WTO, 2009). While some countries experienced episodes of sharp sectoral
drops in exports or imports during the past, the current trade collapse is remarkably wide-ranging across
industries and highly synchronized across oecd countries (Arau´jo and Martins, 2009). It’s magnitude
also substantially exceeds the fall in world GDP. Though it is well known that trade is generally more
responsive to macroeconomic shocks than GDP, even when accounting for the long-term increase in
the income elasticity of trade (Freund, 2009), computable general equilibrium models and international
real business cycle models significantly under-predict both the magnitude and the speed of the recent
collapse (see, e.g., Benassy-Que´re´ et al., 2009; Levchenko et al., 2010).
Why was the fall in trade not commensurate with the recession? Many conjectures focusing on the
supply side of trade have been put forward: a dramatic trade credit crunch (Auboin, 2009; Chor and
Manova, 2010); the widespread disruption of global value chains (Yi, 2009);1 or protectionism raising
its ugly head again (Evenett, 2009; Jacks et al., 2011). All these conjectures point at a trade crisis – a
crisis of the activity of trading across national boundaries per se. Alternatively, other conjectures have
been focusing on the demand side of trade: a disproportionate fall in the demand for tradable goods in
most oecd countries (Eaton et al., 2011); or inventory adjustments (Alessandria et al., 2010) and the
postponement of durable goods purchases. In principle, all these mechanisms may have played a role in
the recent collapse. Only empirical analysis can allow us to discriminate between them.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a detailed microeconometric investigation of the
determinants of the trade collapse for a small open economy, Belgium. Matching Belgian microdata for
the universe of firm-country-product exports and imports (excluding entrepoˆt trade) with balance sheet
information, we perform three sets of empirical exercises. First, we decompose the trade collapse along
the extensive and the intensive margins as in Bernard et al. (2009). Changes in the intensive margin
are defined as changes in average trade values per firm-market-product, while changes in the extensive
margin refer to changes in the number of firms, destinations, and products. Second, using an econometric
model of trade growth by firm, country, and product, we investigate the determinants of the fall in trade.
Building on a difference-in-difference approach, we use the first semesters of 2007 and 2008 as the pre-
treatment period and the first semesters of 2008 and 2009 as the post-treatment period, we search
for evidence supporting the aforementioned conjectures by looking at the differential post-treatment
effect of particular firm-, country-, and product-covariates. Last, using again a difference-in-difference
strategy, we examine changes in exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates – as well as exports-
to-production and imports-to-production – ratios across firms. To the best of our knowledge, no other
1As pointed out by Freund (2009), among others, a fall in final demand in a world with fragmented production chains
should have a proportional impact on intermediate trade (disregarding input substitution or price changes). Increasing
fragmentation may explain the long-term rise of the trade elasticity with respect to GDP, but not its short-term rise during
macroeconomic crises. Evidence for the disruption of global value chains during recessions is required to explain higher
short-term trade elasticities. To the best of our knowledge such evidence is missing to date.
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study has so far analyzed the recent trade collapse using firm-level data on both trade and domestic
operations, though doing so is required to see whether international activity has been disproportionately
hit by the crisis.
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, virtually all of the trade collapse occurred at
the intensive margin. In other words, firm exit and the dropping of products and markets played only
a limited role relative to price adjustments and output scaling in explaining changes in trade values.
Furthermore, entry and exit dynamics during the crisis did not substantially differ from those observed
in a ‘normal year’. Our findings echoe those by Bernard et al. (2009) on the 1997 Asian crisis, but are
nonetheless remarkable given the magnitude of the current trade collapse. We also uncover interesting
patterns in the changes of entrants’ and stayers’ export values, that would deserve further analysis using
dynamic trade models.
Second, we isolate firm-, country- and product-specific components of the trade collapse by com-
paring pre- and post-treatment trade growth. The single most important factor explaining changes in
exports is the destination country’s growth rate of GDP. Had growth rates between 2008S1–2009S1
been the same as between 2007S1–2008S1, Belgian exports would have fallen by about 54% less than
what we actually observed. This result is quantitatively close to that reported by Eaton et al. (2011),
despite a very different dataset and methodology. Another finding is that trade in consumer durables
and capital goods fell more severely than trade in other product categories and in particular consumer
non-durables. Had the fall in demand across product categories been equal to the fall in consumer
non-durables, Belgian exports would have fallen by about 21% less than what we actually observed.
Once country- and product-specific components have been controlled for, the remaining contribution of
the firm dimension to the trade collapse is relatively modest. The Belgian credit crunch seems to have
somewhat affected exporters: differences in indebtedness and debt maturity can explain up to 33% of
the firm-level fall in exports.2 Similarly involvement in global value chains can explain about 24% of
the fall in imports. Though there are minor effects of inventory adjustment on imports, they are limited
to the distribution sector only.
Finally, to assess whether international trade has been hit more strongly by the crisis than production
and domestic activity, we use changes in exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates – as well as
exports-to-production and imports-to-production – ratios and regress pre- and post-treatment changes
in those ratios on a number of firm characteristics and industry dummies. Our analysis reveals that there
are almost no systematic differences across firms. In particular, financial variables have no explanatory
power. These results confirm that foreign operations were not significantly more affected than domestic
operations: though exporters indeed suffered from restricted access to credit, their domestic and foreign
sales were equally affected. Similarly, involvement in global value chains did not have any stark effects on
2According to the Central Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of Belgium (nbb), authorized and used credit
lines in the Belgian manufacturing sector decreased by 4.40% and 3.11% respectively between June 2008 and June 2009.
Furthermore lending through letters of credit, typically used in international transactions, decreased by 5.18% over the
same period.
3
imports-to-intermediates ratios. Supply-side conjectures have, therefore, considerably less explanatory
power when used to compare changes in foreign and domestic operations.
Overall, our results suggest that a general fall in demand for tradables – especially for consumer
durables and capital goods – is responsible for about two-thirds of the recent trade collapse in Belgium.
Since trade and domestic activity were affected in roughly similar ways, talking about a ‘trade crisis’
seems inappropriate.
Related literature. Firstly, our paper is closely related to ongoing empirical investigations of the
trade collapse. Baldwin (2009), which includes a large survey of empirical studies concludes in favor of
demand-side explanations. Most studies rely on aggregate data or descriptives, although some decom-
pose the margins of US and French trade, with results similar to ours. Closer to our work, Bricongne et
al. (2009) provide a careful examination of monthly French firm-level exports. They find a dominant
role for the intensive margin, with little differences across exporter size classes. They also find a more
severe fall in sectors that depend more on external finance, and among firms that default on a payment.
They do not, however, systematically exploit balance sheet data to link changes in exports to firm-level
characteristics. Levchenko et al. (2010) examine the variation in US exports and imports across 6-digit
industries. They find some support for the ‘fragmentation explanation’ and some role for durable goods,
but no evidence of a trade credit effect or of inventory adjustments. They also find that industries ex-
periencing larger reductions in domestic output had a larger fall in trade. Chor and Manova (2010)
uncover significant composition effects in US imports, using variation over time in cross-country dif-
ferences in interbank interest rates and cross-industry differences in financial characteristics. However,
due to data limitations, they evaluate financial characteristics at the industry level (thereby potentially
mis-measuring attributes of the subset of exporters) and industrial production indices at the country
level. Eaton et al. (2011) calibrate the Eaton-Kortum model on bilateral trade data for 30 countries.
They find that a global demand shock, especially for durables, can explain most of the fall in trade. Yet,
implicit bilateral trade frictions, as proxied by Head and Ries (2001) indices, also contributed to the fall
in trade for some countries such as China and Japan. Interestingly, Eaton et al. (2011) find orders of
magnitude for the impact of the demand shock on trade that are comparable to ours. Their approach
builds on the structure of a general equilibrium trade model while abstracting from cross-industry and
cross-firm patterns, whereas we focus on the latter aspects using a microeconometric methodology. We
thus view our results as complementary to theirs. Finally, Alessandria et al. (2010) calibrate a model
of inventory adjustment using data for both the US car industry and aggregate US data. Their model
generates a fall in trade in excess of 33% of the fall in output, in line with the data.
Secondly, our work is related to studies of changes in trade patterns during major macroeconomic
crises. Bernard et al. (2009) investigate the contributions of the different margins of trade to changes
in US exports to, and imports from, several Asian countries during the 1997 financial crisis. They
find that most of the adjustments occurred at the intensive margin, thus favoring a quick subsequent
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recovery. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) find that shocks to the health of Japanese exporters’ main banks
explain up to half of changes in firm-level exports, controlling for industry-time fixed effects. They do
not find any effect of bank health on domestic sales. Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) use a difference-in-
difference approach to show that past financial crises caused a greater decrease in exports among firms
that depended to a larger extent on trade credit. Last, Berman and Martin (2009) show in a gravity
framework that countries that are more dependent on trade finance have larger bilateral export declines
in times of financial or currency crises.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines some broad facts about the
current trade collapse and its impact on Belgium. Section 3 decomposes the collapse along various
margins and along various country, product, and firm dimensions. Section 4 presents our difference-
in-difference approach to disentangle the contributions of firm, product and country characteristics to
the observed changes in the intensive margin. Section 5 examines the evolution of changes in domestic
activity compared to changes in international activity. Section 6 discusses what can be learned from
our exercise. Details concerning data sources, as well as the description and construction of variables,
are relegated to Appendix A. Tables and Figures referred to in the main text are found in Appendix B.
Details on robustness checks, including Tables and Figures, are provided in Appendix C.
2 The collapse of Belgian production and trade: an aggregate snap-
shot
We dissect the fall in trade using data from a small open economy, Belgium. Using Belgian data has
several advantages. First, given its small size, international shocks are reasonably exogenous to Belgium.
Second, changes in Belgian GDP and trade were remarkably synchronized with those of other European
Union (eu) countries, thus suggesting that the Belgian experience may apply more broadly. Last, very
high export and import shares of sales and purchases, respectively, make the ‘super trader’ Belgium an
ideal laboratory to study the impacts of the crisis on vertical specialization and global value chains.3
Using Belgian data has, however, the drawback of including a large amount of re-exports. Indeed,
Belgium (in particular Antwerp) is a key port of entry to – and exit from – the eu. Many ‘Belgian’
firms thus trade exclusively with non-resident partners. We deal with this potential problem in two
ways. First, we exploit the information gathered by the National Bank of Belgium (nbb) since 2001
and systematically exclude trade by firms identified as non-resident.4 Second, we control for a firm’s
3According to figures from the World Bank WDI database, Belgian merchandise imports and exports amounted jointly
to 187% of Belgian GDP in 2007.
4Non-resident firms are the main re-exporters. They are identified by the Belgian customs using information from VAT
declarations. Firms with a Belgian VAT identifier that have a foreign legal address and firms offering fiscal representation
services to foreign firms are considered by default as non-resident. Non-residents must report how much they trade with
residents (domestic trade) and non-residents (re-exports) in VAT declarations. They are classified as ‘pure’ non-residents
if they are not involved in any trade transactions with residents, and as ‘mixed’ non-residents otherwise. We exclude both
types of non-residents. Note that non-resident firms are not compelled to file balance sheets. Non-resident foreign trade
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industry in our regressions. Doing so should largely capture the remaining re-exports which are strongly
concentrated on wholesalers’ and retailers’ foreign trade.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
We first provide an aggregate snapshot of the Belgian trade collapse. Figure 1 depicts the dramatic
decrease of imports and exports from November 2008 onwards, with monthly merchandise exports and
imports falling by about 10% relative to their value a year before. The situation deteriorates until
January 2009, when it stabilizes at a steady lower level until the end of our data coverage period (June
2009). Furthermore, Figure 1 reveals seasonal fluctuations. For these reasons, we will focus throughout
the paper on a comparison between the first semesters of 2008 and 2009 (henceforth, 2008S1 and 2009S1).
Exports and imports of goods by Belgian residents fell by 26.23% and 27.77%, respectively, between
these two periods.
Differences across products categories. An important finding from previous studies using aggre-
gate data (e.g., Baldwin, 2009) is that the trade collapse has not been uniform across products. Belgium
is no exception: as shown in Figure 2, we observe large differences in export and import changes across
broad product categories, despite the absence of special sectoral fiscal stimulus packages during the
period we consider. Trade in intermediates and consumer durables fell much more dramatically than
trade in other product categories, energy being an exception. These aggregate statistics seem to lend
support to explanations based on the disruption of global value chains or the postponement of durable
goods and equipment purchases.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here.
The left panel of Figure 3 provides a finer breakdown of the trade collapse across 2-digit Prodcom-
2008 codes.5 As can be seen from the Figures, trade in nearly all broad product categories fell, though in
a very heterogeneous way. As for exports, ‘Other mining and quarrying’ and ‘Manufacture of basic met-
als’ suffered the largest drops of nearly 50%, while a few other categories like ‘Printing and reproduction
of recorded media’, ‘Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations’ and ‘Manufacture
of other transport equipment’ saw their exports increase during the period. A similar pattern holds for
imports.
Foreign and domestic operations. In line with developments in other oecd countries, Belgian
trade fell much more than GDP. Across all goods, the fall of about 26% in exports and 28% in imports
must be contrasted with a ‘modest’ 3.25% fall in nominal GDP over the same period. However, trade
involves essentially manufactured goods and is not value added so that the fall in trade should be
accounted for about 26% of Belgian exports and 22% of Belgian imports in 2008. The figures for 2009 are 28% and 25%,
respectively.
5The Prodcom classification, and in particular the 2008 version, is a hybrid product/activity classification used in the
eu as a bridge between the main traded product classification (the CN8 nomenclature) and the main activity classification
(NACE).
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compared with the fall in manufacturing production value. Restricting the analysis to those goods for
which data on production is available from the Prodcom dataset, the fall of about 25% in exports and
24% in imports closely mimics the roughly 25% fall in manufacturing production value over the same
period.6 Hence, in the aggregate, the fall in trade was commensurate with the fall in manufacturing
production. As can be seen from the right panel of Figure 3, this pattern also broadly holds across
2-digit Prodcom-2008 codes, with some sectors even increasing their exports/imports to production
ratios.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
Restricting ourselves again to goods for which data on production is available, Figure 4 reports
monthly changes in the export-to-production and import-to-production ratios from January 2005 to
June 2009. Figure 4 confirms the absence of a strong differential trend between production and trade
for Belgium: if anything, it points to an increase (rather than a decrease) of these measures.
Geographical structure of the trade collapse. Table 1 breaks down changes in total Belgian
trade (exports plus imports) with its top-100 trading partners between 2008S1 and 2009S1. On the one
hand, trade with the Netherlands (Belgium’s most important trading partner) fell by 31.83%. Trade
with other major eu partners (Germany, France, UK, Italy) as well as with Japan, Korea and the US
fell by roughly similar magnitudes. On the other hand, trade with China and Hong Kong, the GDP of
which kept growing during the period, was much less affected. While there does not seem to be any clear
geographical structure in trade flow changes, GDP growth could be a promising dimension to explore.
We come back to that point later.7
Insert Table 1 about here.
Summary of the aggregate snapshot. Belgian exports and imports fell faster than GDP but
roughly commensurate with manufacturing production value. The fall in trade showed substantial
variation across product categories, with particularly strong drops in ‘Consumer durables’ and ‘Capital
goods’. To some extent, it also varied across origin and destination markets: trade with eu partners,
Japan and the US was more affected than trade with China and Hong Kong.
3 Margins of the trade collapse and firm dynamics
To gauge each margin’s contribution to the Belgian trade collapse, we perform a decomposition of
changes in exports and imports along the lines suggested by Bernard et al. (2009).
6See Appendix A for further details on the Prodcom dataset. Based on that dataset, manufacturing production volumes
fell by 18%, while manufacturing production value fell by 25%. These statistics are consistent with the small changes in
overall exports-to-production and imports-to-production ratios presented in the right panel of Figure 3. Observe also that
the overall change in prices and quantities is roughly comparable to the one of aggregate trade presented in Section 3.
7The suspiciously large growth of trade with Ireland might be related to abusive transfer pricing given that Ireland’s
corporate tax rate is substantially lower than Belgium’s.
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3.1 The extensive and intensive margins
Belgian exports X in a given time period can be decomposed as X = f c g x, where f , c and g denote the
the number of exporters, the average number of countries each exporter sells to, and the average number
of products each exporter ships to each country, respectively; and where x ≡ X/(f c g) are average sales
per exporter-country-product. Defining ∆X ≡ X
′
/X, where X
′
refers to exports in another period,
and applying this ∆ transformation to the other variables, we may decompose the change in Belgian
exports between 2008S1 and 2009S1 as follows:
∆X = ∆f ∆c∆g∆x. (1)
Changes in the first three terms of expression (1) are referred to as changes in the extensive margin of
trade, while changes in the last term are referred to as changes in the intensive margin.8 Information
about physical quantities exported allows us to further decompose changes in the intensive margin into
changes in average quantities (q) and in average prices (p): ∆x ≡ ∆q∆p. We provide more detailed
information about how this latter decomposition is implemented in Appendix A. The changes in imports,
∆M , can of course be decomposed in the same way.
Insert Table 2 about here.
As mentioned earlier, Belgian exports for all firm-country-product combinations fell by about 26%
between 2008S1 and 2009S1. The top panel of Table 2 reveals that, despite the huge fall, the number of
exporters and the number of products shipped on average by each exporter to each country increased
by 0.96% and by 0.16%, respectively. The average number of countries served by Belgian exporters
dropped by -1.92%. Changes at the extensive margin hence decreased Belgian exports by (1.0096 ×
0.9808 × 1.0016 − 1) × 100% = −0.82%. As can be seen from Column 6 in Table 2, changes at the
extensive margin are dwarfed by changes at the intensive margin. Indeed, the average value of exports
per firm-country-product fell by 25.63% between 2008S1 and 2009S1. Thus, as can be seen from the
last line, the intensive margin contributes to more than 97% of the observed change in exports, whereas
the contribution of the extensive margin is less than 3%.9
One distinct advantage of our dataset is that it provides information on either quantities or weights of
shipments for each firm-country-product observation. This allows us, as mentioned before, to decompose
the change in export values more finely into quantity and price changes.10 As can be seen from the
last two columns of Table 2, changes in the intensive margin are mainly driven by changes in quantities
8We have neither information on the number of trading partners nor on shipments for each exporter per country-product
combination. Thus, our intensive margin ∆x still contains some ‘extensive margin’ components that we cannot isolate.
9Combining the two margins of trade, the total change in Belgian exports is given by (1.0096 × 0.9808 × 1.0016 ×
0.7437 − 1) × 100% = −26.23%. Letting EM and IM denote the extensive and the intensive margins, this total change
can be expressed as ∆X = ∆IM×∆EM. Using logarithms, we compute the relative contribution of the intensive and the
extensive margins to the total change in trade as ln(∆IM)/ln(∆X) and ln(∆EM)/ln(∆X), respectively.
10For the finer decomposition using changes in quantities and in prices, the total change in exports is decomposed as
(1.0096 × 0.9808 × 1.0016 × 0.8 × 0.9296 − 1) × 100% = −26.23%, where the last two terms in the decomposition are the
changes in the average quantity and the average price, respectively.
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shipped. On average, Belgian exports by firm-country-product decreased in terms of quantities by 20%.
Average unit prices also fell, but ‘only’ by 7.04%.
The bottom panel of Table 2 performs the same decomposition for total Belgian imports, which fell
by about 28% across all firm-country-product combinations between 2008S1 and 2009S1. Observe that
the overall picture is very similar to that of exports, although there is even slightly less change at the
extensive margin. There seems to be some ‘downsizing’ in terms of the average number of countries
and the average number of products per country each firm imports, but this is almost completely offset
by more firms importing. As can be seen from the last two columns and the last line in Table 2, the
intensive margin accounts again for almost all the change in imports and most of it is driven by a sharp
decrease in quantities. A first clear conclusion thus emerges: the collapse of both Belgian exports and
imports is overwhelmingly driven by a fall in exports or imports per firm-country-product, itself driven
to a large extent by a sharp fall in quantities exported or imported and some decrease in unit prices.
To gauge whether the trade collapse visible in Table 2 roughly affects all firms, sectors, and trading
partners equally, we also repeat the above decompositions by splitting our sample more finely along
various dimensions. In particular, we focus on the following four sets of questions: (i) Is there a
geographic pattern in the trade collapse, i.e., are Belgian trade margins behaving differently across
‘regions’? (ii) Are large or small, and more or less productive, firms affected differently? (iii) Does a
firm’s ownership status (foreign vs. domestically owned) and its multinational status matter? (iv) Does
a firm’s debt structure in terms of overall leverage or financial versus commercial debt matter? A detailed
decomposition of changes in exports and imports at the different margins along these dimensions can
provide some first insights into the key explanations of the sharp fall in trade during the 2008S1–2009S1
trade collapse. In particular, item (i) provides information about geographic shifts in trade flows, while
items (ii)–(iv) provide information about reallocation of market shares across firms, the collapse of
global value chains, and the importance of access to credit.
Insert Table 3 about here.
As can be seen from the subset of results collected in Table 3, the overall decomposition of margins,
while not identical, remains qualitatively very similar across all specifications. In particular, the intensive
margin remains dominant whereas changes at the extensive margin are uniformly small. The key points
worth noting are that: (i) trade in goods classified as ‘Intermediates, Capital, & Durables’ fell more
than trade in ‘Other goods’; (ii) the extensive margin was more strongly affected for Belgian trade with
its eu partners that for trade with the rest-of-the-world; (iii) larger and more productive firms were
hit a bit more severely, especially for imports, and multinationals contracted their imports more than
firms without an international ownership structure; and (iv) firms with larger debt-to-liabilities ratios
or with a larger share of financial (as opposed to commercial) debts experienced slightly larger declines
in exports. While firms were, therefore, to some extent affected differently by the crisis, it is fair to say
that the magnitudes of those differences are relatively small.
To summarize, the most striking and robust feature that emerges from our data is that the ‘full
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extensive margin’ (i.e., the number of firms times the number of countries per firm times the number
of products per country-firm) is extremely stable, both for imports and exports. This result continues
to hold true when we decompose the sample into various subgroups. Put differently, almost all of the
action takes place at the intensive margin, with virtually no change occurring at the extensive margin.
This finding firstly highlights the extreme flexibility of firms, of their input suppliers, and of their clients.
Secondly, negligible changes at the extensive margin, even in the wake of a major shock, suggest that
sunk costs are an extremely important component of trade costs. If trade costs were recoverable (either
variable or fixed) we should have seen a massive contraction at the extensive margin with firms exiting
markets and severing trade relations to cut losses. Thirdly, our findings also suggest that trade should
pick up again rapidly as the recession fades away and as the macroeconomic environment returns to
normal.11
3.2 Firm dynamics and the trade collapse
Table 4 shows that about 98% of both 2008S1 and 2009S1 exports were accounted for by ‘stayers’ – firms
that were exporting in both semesters. The remaining share in 2008 was due to ‘exiters’ – firms that
exported in 2008S1 but not in 2009S1. The remaining share in 2009S1 was accounted for by ‘entrants’
– firms that exported in 2009S1 but not in 2008S1. Table 4 further reveals that the 2007S1–2008S1
patterns were very similar, thus suggesting that 2008S1–2009S1 was not exceptional in terms of firm
dynamics. Despite slightly more exit from and slightly less entry into foreign trade, and a smaller export
share of entrants during the crisis, the overall pattern is not very different from the one observed in
the foregoing year. In particular, there is still a large turnover and some net entry despite the crisis.
Finally, the observed patterns also broadly hold for imports.
Insert Table 4 about here.
The absence of massive exit from foreign trade during a major crisis is striking. This finding gives
further support to dynamic trade models with sunk entry costs (e.g., Das et al., 2007). The fact that
almost all firms remain active traders during a period where trade contracts by 25% can be explained
by the option value of staying in the presence of these sunk entry costs. Of course, an alternative
explanation could be that firms expected a short crisis and thus did not want to severe links too quickly.
The bottom part of Table 3 summarizes the margin decomposition where we compare trade of the
2008S1 and 2009S1 cohorts of stayers, entrants, and exiters. In the case of exports, it reveals some
interesting facts that can be related to recent models of export dynamics. Comparing across cohorts,
2009S1 entrants and exiters fared much worse than the previous cohort – a 77% decrease in export
values. Meanwhile, 2009S1 stayers fared worse than the previous cohort, partly including the same
firms, but less dramatically so – about 27% decrease in export values. This finding is at odds with
Melitz-type models, where a common demand shock should affect entrants and stayers identically. Part
11In April 2010, Belgian monthly imports and exports were already back to their April 2008 level.
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of the explanation involves compositional effects through differences in entrants’ number of products and
countries served. Table 3 shows clearly that entrants are much more strongly affected at the extensive
margin than stayers. Nonetheless the magnitude of the gap between entrants and stayers suggests that
something else is at work. Overall a more sophisticated dynamic trade model is necessary to explain why
entry remained substantially stable but 2009S1 entrants exported much less than the previous cohort.
In fact, this finding could help to discriminate between the various mechanisms suggested by the recent
literature.12 We leave this task for future research as it goes beyond the scope of this paper. In the
case of imports, we find that entry remained stable but more exit occurred. There were considerably
more exiters than in the previous cohort, but the increase was offset by an equally considerable fall in
average imports. Average imports of exiters fell by about as much as those of stayers. Overall, the rise
in the number of importers during the trade collapse was dwarfed by the fall in the intensive margin,
as noted earlier, but understanding why the number of importers increased during a major crisis would
deserve further investigation.
While our descriptive exercises highlight several insights, they are not suited to identify the magni-
tudes, significance, and contribution of the different determinants of the trade fall. We therefore next
turn to econometric analysis, taking full advantage of our firm-country-product trade data and balance
sheet data.
4 Firm-, country-, and product-level characteristics: the determi-
nants of the trade collapse
As shown in the foregoing, the bulk of the fall in Belgian trade occurred at the intensive margin.
Therefore, we can safely analyze the determinants of the trade collapse by focusing solely on that
margin, i.e., firm-country-product transaction values. Given the overwhelming contribution of stayers
to export and import values – as shown in the previous Section, 98% of 2008S1 and 2009S1 exports
were accounted for by stayers – we can explore the determinants of the fall in trade by restricting the
analysis to these firms.13
In this Section, we look for the various conjectures put forth in the literature and quantify their
contribution to the fall in trade by looking at the differential impact of firm, product and country
characteristics before and after the start of the collapse. If, say, highly leveraged firms experience lower
export growth than other firms in a ‘normal’ period, nothing could be learned from the simple fact that
they suffered a stronger fall in trade during the collapse. However, by comparing the negative export
12Recent work on firm-level export dynamics builds on several mechanisms to explain export dynamics at the intensive
and extensive margins: serially correlated permanent shocks to TFP, credit or capacity constraints, uncertainty about
demand or costs, search and learning dynamics, reputation-building, endogenous R&D investment or quality upgrading.
13Such an analysis would be flawed in the presence of large changes at the extensive margin. Had the number of exporting
firms drastically fallen, we would have needed to analyze the determinants of export participation before and after the
collapse (by using, for example, a probit approach). The stability of the extensive margin across firms, products, and
markets allows us to neglect these determinants in the analysis as they are of second-order importance.
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growth effect of being highly leveraged before and after the start of the collapse we can infer whether
restricted access to credit played a role or not and gauge its magnitude.
4.1 An econometric model of changes in trade values
The primary data for our regression analysis are export and import values by firm-country-product in
2007S1, 2008S1, and 2009S1. As stated before, we consider stayers only. We aggregate data at the
HS4 product level (more than 1,000 product categories) and consider only ‘continuing triples’, i.e., firm-
country-product trade triples that record positive values in two consecutive semesters among the three
we consider.14 Our aim is to provide econometric results that can make sense of aggregate changes
in trade, and focusing on continuing triples avoids giving too much weight to low-value triples (most
discontinuous triples are indeed of low value). To push this idea even further, we also experimented
with weighted least squares for the continuous triples. The results, reported in Appendix C, are almost
identical. We thus present, in what follows, only the un-weighted results with continuous triples.
We describe our econometric model for exports, the model for imports being identical. Using data
on continuous triples only, we consider as dependent variable the change in log export values of firm
f to country c of product p, ∆Xtfcp ≡ logX
t+1
fcp − logX
t
fcp, between two consecutive semesters (i.e.,
log export growth between 2007S1 and 2008S1, as well as between 2008S1 and 2009S1). Using the
difference-in-difference terminology, the pre-treatment (trade collapse) period corresponds to 2007S1–
2008S1 while the post-treatment period is given by 2008S1–2009S1. Together with the post-treatment
time dummy variable TCt, we consider as independent variables a number of firm, country and product
characteristics that proxy for the various conjectures put forward to explain the trade collapse, along
with their interactions with TCt. Formally, the estimating equation is given by:
∆Xtfcp = α+ TC
t + β
′
1W
t
fcp + β
′
2W
t
fcpTC
t + ǫtfcp (2)
whereWtfcp is a vector containing our firm (F
t
f ), country (C
t
c), and product (P
t
p) characteristics together
with a battery of industry dummies (Sts); and where ǫfcp is a residual term with the standard properties
for the consistency of OLS.15 In the case of firm covariates, we use one-year lagged balance sheet
information (i.e., for example, 2007 data for 2008S1–2009S1 export growth) to somewhat mitigate
14Any firm-country-product trade triple that records positive values in both 2007S1 and 2008S1 (or 2008S1 and 2009S1)
is a continuing transaction. By definition, continuing triples are a subset of stayers’ triples. They account for the lion’s
share of trade values in 2007S1, 2008S1, and 2009S1. For example, there were 272,216 continuing triples out of the 433,529
(430,000) export triples in 2008S1 (2009S1), thus corresponding to 62.79% (63.31%) of the number of total triples and to
93.66% (91.83%) of total transaction values. The observed fall in the value of continuing export triples between 2008S1
and 2009S1 is 27.48%, which is quite close to the 26.23% decrease recorded for all export triples. As for imports, there were
331,981 continuing triples out of the 560,258 (559,530) triples in 2008S1 (2009S1), thus corresponding to 59.26% (59.33%) of
the number of total triples and to 92.83% (90.47%) of total transaction values. The observed fall in the value of continuing
import triples between 2008S1 and 2009S1 is 29.57%, which again closely matches the 27.77% decrease recorded for all
import triples.
15The industry dummies are at the 2-digit NACE classification rev 1.1 level. The NACE rev 1.1 is the main industry
classification in the European Community. It draws extensively on the ISIC rev 3.
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endogeneity of firm characteristics. Having data varying along three dimensions, we follow the procedure
of Cameron et al. (2011) and apply multi-level clustering to obtain more reliable standard errors.
Equation (2) is an econometric model of change in log trade values. The vector of coefficients β1
measures the impact of our covariates in a ‘normal’ period (2007S1–2008S1), while the vector β2 captures
changes induced by the trade collapse treatment (2008S1–2009S1).16
Insert Table 5 about here.
Table 5 summarizes the list of covariates we use in (2). All firm characteristics prefixed by ‘D’ are
binary variables, taking value 1 if a particular characteristic is above the sectoral median across all
trading firms and 0 otherwise. Doing so allows us to maximize the number of firms we can include in
the analysis while reducing the risk of bias due to measurement error and potential outliers.17 It also
provides us, as in the case of standardized regression coefficients, with a relevant metric to compare
the contribution of the different firm characteristics to changes in trade values. Last but not least, the
binary specification is able to broadly account for non-linear effects of the covariates.
4.2 Results
Table 6 reports coefficients and standard errors obtained from estimating (2) via OLS. We run two
separate regressions, one for export growth and one for import growth. For each regression, we report
two sets of coefficients in separate columns. The first and third columns (Base) report β1 parameters for,
respectively, the export and import growth regressions of the pre-treatment period (2007S1–2008S1).
The second and fourth columns (DD) provide β2 parameters, i.e., changes in the responsiveness of
export and import growth into the post-treatment period of the trade collapse (2008S1–2009S1).
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here.
Firm characteristics. Table 6 shows that firm-level difference-in-difference coefficients are, in general,
small and rarely significant, and that the model’s explanatory power is very weak. Table 7 further reveals
16In unreported estimations, available upon request, we consider 2006S1–2007S1 as a ‘normal’ period obtaining virtually
identical results.
17Our analysis covers the bulk of continuing triples. Considering the period 2008S1–2009S1, there are 204,598 (out
of 272,216) continuing export triples for which all data on firm, country, and product characteristics is available. These
triples represent 69.50% of 2008S1 export values and 68.41% of 2009S1 export values. The fall in export values between
2008S1 and 2009S1 corresponding to these triples is 27.21%, which is very close to the 27.48% export decrease for all
continuing triples. Overall, the data covers 6,959 firms, 170 countries, and 1,075 HS4 products. Considering again the
period 2008S1–2009S1, we have 255,035 (out of 331,981) continuing import triples for which all the data is available.
These triples represent 70.47% of 2008S1 import values and 67.62% of 2009S1 import values. The fall in import values
between 2008S1 and 2009S1 corresponding to these continuing triples is 30.66%, in line with the 29.57% import decrease
for all continuing triples. Overall, the data covers 13,545 firms, 148 countries, and 1,099 HS4 products. One may a priori
worry about potential biases that could arise because we have to drop a number of continuing triples for which data –
essentially balance sheet information – is missing. However, balance sheet data are missing mainly for Belgian affiliates of
foreign groups that do not exist as a separate legal entity in Belgium. Such firms are not required to report unconsolidated
accounts even if they are technically considered as residents by Belgian customs. Including these firms in the analysis
would have been desirable, but a positive aspect of dropping them is that they are likely to engage in substantial amounts
of re-exports. When taken together, our focus on Belgian residents only, the exclusion of the above-mentioned firms, and
the inclusion of industry fixed effects represent a very conservative way of dealing with the issue of re-exports.
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that there is no evident problem of collinearity among our firm-level variables. At first sight, our results
thus suggest that: (i) the trade collapse has been quite symmetric across firms within a given industry;
(ii) some of the supply-side explanations of the trade collapse clearly play at best a second-order role.
We now discuss results for each group of covariates. As indicated by the positive and significant
coefficient of Dsize in the first column (Base) of Table 6, exports by large firms grow on average 3.71%
faster than those of other firms in a ‘normal’ year. As further shown by the coefficient of Dsize in
column two, there has been no significant change in that pattern after the start of the trade collapse.
Note that the latter finding also holds for productivity Dprod. This confirms our margin decomposition
of Section 3, with the additional insight that neither firm, nor country, nor product covariates do
interfere. As for import growth, more productive firms did suffer more during the collapse, though
the implied contribution to the fall is rather limited. To assess the magnitude of this effect, we can
compute the counterfactual 2008S1–2009S1 import growth without a differential effect ofDprod by letting
Dprod×TC
t = 0. Had firms with above-median productivity been affected by the collapse as those with
below-median productivity, the overall fall in exports (27.21%) would have been 14.74% less severe, i.e.
0.2721 × 0.1474 = 4.01% growth points.
Involvement in global value-added chains (as measured by the value and significance of Dinterm share,
Dshare exp sales, and Dvalue add chain in column two) did not differentially affect export growth in 2008S1–
2009S1 as compared to 2007S1–2008S1. This casts doubt on the hypothesis of a disruption of global value
chains (Yi, 2009). Observe further that Dshare imp interm is actually positive and significant in column
two, indicating that firms with above-median ratios of imports to intermediates experienced a smaller
fall in exports! When computing the counterfactual 2008S1–2009S1 export growth in the absence of a
differential effect of Dshare imp interm, i.e., by letting Dshare imp interm×TC
t = 0, we find that the overall
fall in exports would have been 22.71% stronger! Turning to imports, an above-median involvement in
global value chains, and in particular Dinterm share and Dshare exp sales, does correspond to lower import
growth in 2008S1–2009S1. However, the contribution is modest. When both Dinterm share × TC
t = 0
and Dshare exp sales × TC
t = 0, all else equal, we find that 23.84% of the overall import fall would not
have occurred in this counterfactual world.
Variables proxying for firms’ financial structure (as measured by the value and the significance of
Dext fin dep, Dshare debts o liab, Dshare debts due after one, and Dshare fin debt) appear to play some role in
2008S1–2009S1 export changes. Firms with shorter debt maturity and a larger fraction of financial (as
opposed to commercial) debt experienced a significantly larger fall of exports during the trade collapse.
Our findings thus lend some support to the trade credit crunch hypothesis (Auboin, 2009; Chor and
Manova, 2010). How large is that effect? Firms with above-median debt maturity experienced a 4.56%
higher export growth, whereas firms with above-median financial debts saw their exports shrink by
about 6.68% more. Both values must be compared with the 27.21% total fall in export values in our
sample. To further assess the magnitude, we predict the counterfactual export growth in the absence of
negative financial effects, letting Dshare debts due after one×TC
t = 1 and Dshare fin debt×TC
t = 0, all else
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equal. We find that about one-third (33.06%) of the 2008S1–2009S1 fall in exports can be attributed
to our measures of finance. It is worth noting, however, that financial variables do not seem to affect
changes in import values at all.18
The difference-in-difference coefficient for Dshare stock, proxying for inventory capacity, is not signif-
icant for both export and import growth. The latter finding contrasts with the inventory adjustment
explanation as we would have expected imports of firms with greater inventory capacity to contract
more, all else equal (Alessandria et al., 2010). Still, it may be argued that inventory adjustments occur
primarily among distributors. Therefore we also run the same regressions on a sub-sample comprising
firms from the distribution sector only (NACE industries 50, 51 and 52), which represented 40.25% of
Belgian imports in 2008S1.19 We find that imports of distributors with above-median inventory-to-sales
ratios significantly fell by 3.23 percentage points more than those of other distributors in 2008S1–2009S1.
This coefficient accounts for 11.80% of the fall in imports of the distribution sector. However, we find
no effects of stocks in the export growth regressions. Overall, we conclude that, although inventory
adjustment accounted for some of the import fall in an important sector, it played a minor role in the
trade collapse in general.
Neither multinationals nor foreign owned firms have been differentially affected by the trade collapse.
Both the export and the import difference-in-difference coefficients are indeed not significant, thus
lending further support to the finding that there was no major disruption of global value chains. Finally,
interactions of two-digit NACE industry dummies with the trade collapse treatment TCt, the reference
industry being ‘Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers’, are significant only in 9 cases,
thereby suggesting that strong industry patterns are not to blame either.
Country characteristics. We view GDP growth as the key variable to gauge the contribution of a
demand shock to the collapse of exports. Two results stand out from our analysis. First, the coefficient
differs widely between 2007S1–2008S1 and 2008S1–2009S1. In a ‘normal’ period, the coefficient of log
export change with respect to the trading partners’ percentage growth of GDP is around one percent
(0.0138). This means that a 1% increase in the aggregate demand of a given country, as proxied by its
percentage growth of GDP, translates into a 1.38% increase in export values to that destination. To the
extent that such an increase in exports reflects a proportional change in the demand for tradable goods,
our coefficient is broadly consistent with standard cross-section/cross-country gravity models in which
the coefficient on GDP of the export destination is close to unity. However, during the trade collapse,
the responsiveness of changes in log export values with respect to percentage growth of GDP of the
importing countries increased significantly (0.0138 + 0.0115 = 0.0253), thus suggesting that the global
recession induced a disproportionate fall in the demand for tradable goods.
18As in most related work, our variables only imperfectly capture access to credit in general and trade finance in
particular. However, contrary to most other work on the crisis, we use firm-level measures of these variables and do not
rely on even more imperfect sectoral measures.
19Regression tables are omitted to save space but are available upon request.
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Insert Figure 5 about here.
To gain further insights on the relationship between firm export growth and GDP growth in the
destination country, we also consider the presence of non-linearities. In particular, we include GDP
growth to the powers two and three, both alone as well as interacted with the trade collapse post-
treatment dummy TCt, as further regressors in our estimations. Results indicate that there are indeed
non-linearities at work in a typical year. However, difference-in-difference coefficients reveal that the
trade collapse caused a structural change in the relationship between GDP and export growth rates. As
can be seen from Figure 5, plotting the estimated marginal effect of gdp growth on export growth in both
periods, the post-treatment curve deviates more from the 45 degree line (the unit-elastic benchmark),
especially for countries with large GDP drops, than the pre-treatment curve. In words, the negative
shock on GDP has been amplified strongly the more negative that shock was.
Finally, we can again make use of our model to gauge the contribution of the demand shock to the
change in log export values. To this end, we consider the counterfactual situation where GDP growth
rates for 2008S1–2009S1 are replaced with those prevailing in 2007S1–2008S1, all else equal. We find
that, had growth in GDP between 2008S1–2009S1 been the same as in the previous period, the export
drop would have been 54.15% less severe. We may thus conclude that about 54% of the export collapse
can be attributed to a generalized fall in the demand for tradable goods. This result is similar to that
of Eaton et al. (2011), though both approaches use very different data and methodologies.
Turning to imports, the interpretation of the GDP growth coefficient, which now refers to the
exporting country, is more difficult. In any case, as can be seen from Table 6, both the base and the
difference-in-difference coefficients are not significant. We can nevertheless gauge the counterfactual
impact of Belgian GDP decline on imports by using the GDP growth coefficient estimated for exports
and data on Belgian GDP growth for the two periods. We find that 44.65% of the import drop can be
attributed to a fall in demand for tradable goods in Belgium. Hence, almost half of the fall in imports
is due to the demand shock.
The difference-in-difference coefficients of the two dummies for trade with non-eu countries and
outside of the oecd are both positive, sizeable, and significant for export and import growth. This means
that trade with countries outside of the eu helped to mitigate the trade collapse. In a counterfactual
world in which growth in trade outside of the eu would have followed the same trend as that observed
in the eu, i.e. both OECD NO EU ×TCt = 0 and NO OECD NO EU ×TCt = 0, exports (imports)
would have fallen by 20.86% (38.27%) more than what we observed. Note that the fact that non-eu
trade, especially imports, fell less than eu trade suggests indirectly that protectionist measures played
only a minor role in explaining the trade collapse (see Eaton et al., 2011, for similar findings).
As for fluctuations in exchange rates, the magnitude of the coefficients indicates that they have
affected exports (imports) more (less) strongly during the trade collapse period. However, the implied
magnitudes for changes in export and import values are small. Using the estimated model to evaluate a
counterfactual situation in which no exchange rate change against the Euro would have occurred during
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2008S1–2009S1, i.e. both exch rate change and exch rate change × TCt are set to zero, reveals that
fluctuations of the Euro can be blamed for only a very little share (5.92%) of the total drop in Belgian
exports.
Product characteristics. The reference group for product dummies in Table 6 is consumer non-
durables. Therefore, the foregoing discussions and the magnitudes of the fall in demand apply solely
to this category of goods. However, in line with the margin decomposition provided in Section 3,
interactions of product dummies with TCt for the categories intermediates, consumer durables, and
capital goods are all negative and strongly significant in the export growth analysis, thereby indicating
that these goods experienced a larger fall. As for imports, the same result holds for intermediates and
consumer durables.
What are the causes of such different behavior across product categories? The answer is likely to be a
differential fall in demand. To provide evidence of this, we estimate our export growth model separately
for each of the broad product categories.20 Our estimates of the growth rate GDP coefficient are in
line with the ultimate conclusion of Baldwin (2009) that ‘postponable goods’ have been particularly
hit by the negative demand shock affecting tradable goods. More precisely, the difference-in-difference
coefficient we obtain when restricting the sample to consumer durables (0.0127) is higher than that
when restricting the sample to consumer non-durables (0.0022). Even higher coefficients (0.0156 and
0.0186) are obtained in intermediates goods and capital goods regressions, respectively. Evaluating a
counterfactual scenario in which the fall in trade would have been the same across product categories and
equal to the one of the reference group ‘consumer non-durables’, i.e., letting the significant interactions
of product dummy coefficients with TCt be equal to zero, delivers the following results: 21.47% of the
export collapse is due to a more severe shock affecting postponable goods, the equivalent figure for
imports being 10.95%.
Finally, the difference-in-difference coefficient of the Rauch (1999) measure of product differentiation
(fraclib diff ) is positive and significant for both export and import growth. This suggests that more
differentiated goods experienced a smaller fall in trade. In particular, had the fall for differentiated
goods been as severe as for other goods, the export (import) drop would have been 21.47% (23.32%)
more severe.
Summary of findings. In the case of exports, our results point to the important role played by a
generalized fall in demand for tradables, especially consumer durables and capital goods. Evidence for
this is provided by an unusually large GDP growth coefficient, sizeable product dummies, and widely
different GDP growth coefficients during 2008S1–2009S1 in regressions for separate product categories.
Restricted access to finance seems to also play a role in the fall in exports, albeit of a smaller magnitude.
We find no strong evidence for the disruption of global value chains or for inventory adjustments. When
20Regression Tables are omitted to save space but are available upon request.
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taken together, the demand shock (about 54%) and financial variables (about 33%) explain the bulk
of the observed fall in Belgian exports during the recent crisis. The remaining effects percolate mostly
through the composition of trade (both in terms of product categories, with durables being hit more;
and in terms of geography, with intra-eu trade suffering more severely).
In the case of imports, a fall in Belgian demand seems to be the main explanation. We find some
limited role for involvement in global value chains, but no role for both trade finance and inventory
adjustments.
5 Trade crisis or trade collapse?
So far, we have uncovered strong evidence that a fall in demand for tradeable goods (particularly for
‘postponable goods’) has been the major cause of the trade collapse. There is also some evidence that
financial constraints contributed to that fall, though to a lesser extent. Observe that these findings
do not per se imply that there has been a trade crisis, i.e., a situation in which international trade
suffered more than domestic trade. To investigate this question, we now examine in detail changes in
exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios at the firm level.21 We further complement this
analysis with some evidence about firm-level exports-to-production and imports-to-production ratios
using the sub-sample of firms for which production data is available.22
As shown earlier in Figures 3 and 4, there seems to be no systematic fall in exports-to-production
and imports-to-production ratios, both in the whole economy and across broad product categories. In
fact, those ratios even increased in some product categories, thus implying that domestic production
contracted in some cases more than international trade. This descriptive evidence already casts some
doubts on the existence of a ‘trade crisis’ in Belgium. Indeed, if international trade per se is in a
crisis, both ratios should have fallen during the period we consider. Nevertheless, there might still be
compositional effects across firms and industries, and those can provide valuable information on the
channel(s) through which the fall in demand affected Belgian exports and imports. We therefore now
revisit this issue using a more detailed micro-econometric analysis.
To this end, we use again a difference-in-difference approach where the treatment is the trade collapse.
In the main text, we focus on exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios due to wider data
coverage. However, the analysis of exports-to-production and imports-to-production ratios, that we
report as a robustness check in Appendix C, yields qualitatively similar results. We first construct the
21Data on firm turnover (sales revenue) and purchases of intermediates for 2007S1, 2008S1, and 2009S1 come from
monthly and quarterly VAT declarations. The frequency at which declarations have to be filed depends on the firm’s size.
See Appendix A for more details.
22Data on firm-level production for 2007S1, 2008S1, and 2009S1 comes from monthly Prodcom declarations covering
medium and large Belgian manufacturing firms only. See Appendix A.
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log of the firm-level ratio of exports-to-turnover in the first semester of year t as follows:
φtf,X = log
(
Xtf
Turntf
)
, (3)
where Turntf denotes firm f ’s turnover and X
t
f stands for exports aggregated at the firm-level. Analo-
gously, we define the log of the firm-level ratio of imports-to-purchased intermediates in the first semester
of year t as follows:
φtf,I = log
(
Itf
Intetf
)
, (4)
where Intetf denotes firm f ’s total purchases of intermediates and I
t
f represents imports aggregated at
the firm-level. We consider the three semesters 2007S1, 2008S1, and 2009S1 and regress both φt+1f,X−φ
t
f,X
and φt+1f,I − φ
t
f,I on a constant, the post-treatment time dummy variable TC
t, the same set of (lagged)
firm-level characteristics used in the previous Section, and interactions between firm-level characteristics
and TCt. We use OLS and provide robust standard errors. To get a closer match with aggregate figures,
we also experimented with weighted least squares. Results, reported in Appendix C, are qualitatively
similar when compared to our baseline specification.
The sample of firms used in our analysis is given by the stayers for which both balance sheet
information and VAT declarations are available, i.e., 8,360 (8,250) firms among the 12,964 (12,481)
export stayers and 14,388 (13,983) firms among the 23,782 (21,209) import stayers for the period 2008S1–
2009S1 (2007S1–2008S1). VAT declarations are virtually exhaustive so that the binding data constraint
is the availability of balance sheet information. For example, the data cover 73.07% (73.61%) of 2008S1
(2009S1) exports and 71.33% (70.20%) of 2008S1 (2009S1) imports by stayers. As explained before,
most firms that have to be dropped are Belgian affiliates belonging to foreign groups that are considered
as residents by Belgian customs but do not exist as a separate legal entity. It is likely that a substantial
part of the trade done by these firms involves re-exporting and, in that respect, their exclusion from the
analysis is more of an asset than a liability. However, some small firms simply do not submit balance
sheets and have to be dropped.
Let us first highlight a few descriptives about the constructed ratios for the period 2008S1–2009S1.
The difference φ2009f,X − φ
2008
f,X has a mean of −0.0290 and a median of −0.0183: the average exports-
to-turnover ratio decreased by 2.9%, while the median ratio fell by 1.83% with respect to its initial
value. The mean ratio
(
X2008f /Turn
2008
f , not in log
)
in 2008S1 was 35.52%, meaning that the 2.9% fall
translates into a meager 1 percentage point reduction (2.9% × 0.3552 = 0.0103). We can hence already
conclude that its decrease has, on average, been negligible – the ratio of exports-to-turnover at the firm
level has not been affected by the trade collapse. Observe furthermore that the correlation between φ2009f,X
and φ2008f,X equals 0.84, thus suggesting that the pattern has remained very stable at the firm-level during
the trade collapse. Results for imports-to-intermediates ratios convey the same message. The mean of
φ2009f,I − φ
2008
f,I equals −0.0296, while the median equals −0.0124. The average imports-to-intermediates
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ratio decreased by 2.96% while the median ratio fell by 1.24%, starting from an average level of 26.16%.
Thus, changes in that ratio were negligible too. Last, the correlation between φ2009f,I and φ
2008
f,I is 0.79.
Insert Table 8 about here.
Table 8 reports the results of our difference-in-difference estimations. As can be seen from the left
panel of the Table, only the difference-in-difference coefficient of Dsize is significant in explaining changes
in exports-to-turnover ratios for the trade collapse period. This holds despite the fact that, as shown
in Table 7, there is no major problem of collinearity among regressors. We may thus conclude that the
negative effect of financial variables identified in the analysis of the previous Section has affected foreign
trade and domestic activity equally. In other words, the credit crunch has not disproportionately hurt
the activity of trading across national borders per se.
The coefficient of Dsize in column two of Tables 8 indicates that, during the collapse, large firms
experienced a significant reduction of their exports-to-turnover ratio as compared to small firms. To
get a sense of the magnitude, starting with an average exports-to-turnover ratio of 0.3627 in 2008, large
firms would see their ratio decrease by 0.3627 × 0.1020=0.0370 points. This is hardly strong evidence
of a major trade crisis. Turning to imports-to-intermediates ratios, there is slightly more action with
five of the difference-in-difference coefficients being significant. The positive value of for in column
four actually points to foreign owned firms increasing their imports-to-intermediates ratios with respect
to other firms during the collapse. However, there are three measures of involvement in global value
chains that turn out to the significantly negative: Dinterm share, Dshare imp interm, and Dvalue add chain.
Again, given the value of the coefficients, none of them implies stark changes in imports-to-intermediates
ratios. As for interactions of NACE dummies with TCt, the reference industry being again ‘Manufacture
of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers’, they are generally not significant. For example, in both
exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates regressions, only 1 of the 22 manufacturing industry
dummies has a significant coefficient at the 5% confidence level.
The fact that almost all coefficients in the exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates regres-
sions are not significant and that, even when they are, their magnitude is small, leads us logically to
conclude that it is not a trade crisis – just a trade collapse caused by a strong decrease in the demand
for tradables that has equally affected domestic and foreign operations.
6 What have we learned?
Using detailed trade and balance sheet data, we provide a micro-econometric analysis of the fall in
Belgian imports and exports before and during the 2008–2009 trade collapse. A few clear results emerge
from our analysis. First, the overwhelming part of the trade collapse occurred at the intensive margin
and is due to a fall in average quantities and unit prices. Exporters’ and importers’ presence in foreign
markets showed remarkable resilience. Interestingly, there was no massive exit which may be explained
by the existence of large sunk costs of entering foreign markets (Roberts and Tybout, 1997): large sunk
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entry costs create an option value of remaining an exporter or an importer during the crisis. Since most
of the adjustments took place at the intensive margin, Belgian trade expectedly bounced back quickly
after the collapse.23 These results resemble findings on trade during the Asian crisis (Bernard et al.,
2009), but are nonetheless remarkable given the magnitude of the recent trade collapse.
Second, we find overall only little support for supply-side based explanations of the trade collapse.
On the one hand, GDP growth of the destination countries is the single most important determinant
of exports in our econometric analysis, explaining up to 54% of the fall in exports and 45% of the fall
in imports. This applies particularly to the demand for durable goods and capital goods: trade in
these categories fell systematically more, with a greater elasticity to GDP. While studies using more
aggregated data (Baldwin, 2009) or calibrated simulations (Eaton et al., 2011) reach qualitatively and
quantitatively similar conclusions, we are not aware of any other firm-level analysis confirming these
results to date. On the other hand, few firm- or product-level characteristics are systematically related
to the fall in trade, especially when compared with the fall in domestic operations. For instance, access
to credit (as proxied by financial balance sheet variables) can explain about 33% of the fall in exports,
but has no explanatory power regarding exports-to-turnover or exports-to-production ratios. In other
words, financial constraints affected foreign and domestic operations equally. Similarly, involvement in
global value chains, as measured by either the share of imported intermediates or by export intensity,
explains quantitatively some of the collapse of imports, but has little explanatory power on imports-to
intermediate ratios. More generally, exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios did not
show any strong systematic correlation with other firm characteristics, nor did they follow any general
downward trend. If there was a recent increase in trade frictions due to protectionism, it had no sizable
effect on Belgian trade.
Of course, more research is needed to investigate the causes of the disproportionate fall in the de-
mand for tradable goods. Candidate explanations involve deferred consumption of durables due to
precautionary motives, substitution patterns among consumers with non-homothetic preferences, or a
bias towards non-tradables in fiscal stimuli packages. While our data do not allow us to test these
conjectures, we can mention two related findings. First, we found a higher GDP growth elasticity of
capital goods, intermediate goods, and consumer durables exports relative to consumer non-durables.
Second, we found a non-linear relationship between GDP growth on export growth across countries,
with an increase in curvature during the trade collapse. Countries hit by more severe recessions dispro-
portionately reduced their imports from Belgium. Again, an in-depth investigation of these mechanisms
is fundamental to our understanding of the crisis and would be a welcome topic for future work.
Third, some of our findings also raise questions for research on trade and firm dynamics. For instance,
sales of entrants and exiters in 2009S1 were dramatically lower than those of the previous cohort, while
the same was not true for stayers. This fact is at odds with the Melitz (2003) model and would deserve
23Belgium’s monthly exports exceeded the 2008S1 average in June 2010 for the first time since the collapse. Monthly
exports and imports were quickly approaching their average pre-collapse level by late 2010.
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further investigation in relation to recent dynamic export models. It would also be of interest to check
whether initial conditions can have a permanent impact on firms’ survival and subsequent growth. Will
Belgian firms that entered export markets during the crisis perform worse in the future than the other
exporters? Last, the large increase in the number of importers despite the large fall in imports would
also be worthy of investigation.
To conclude, let us point out two caveats of our analysis. As we acknowledged, we do not observe
the number of trading partners a firm has for each product-market combination. The conclusion that
trade collapsed due to a price and quantity adjustment relies on stability in this ‘hidden’ extensive
margin, which we can only conjecture. Also, we do not know to what extent our results generalize to
other countries. Developing countries might be much more severely affected by the credit crunch and
the drying up of trade credit (Berman and Martin, 2009). This would cause a higher trade fall at the
extensive margin there, and make a quick recovery less likely. Furthermore, implicit trade barriers might
have risen more in some pairs of countries than in others (Jacks et al., 2011; Eaton et al., 2011). More
research involving micro-data from other countries is thus certainly called for in the future.
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Appendix.
A Data description
Balance sheet data and firm-level variables. Firm-level variables are constructed from 2006 and
2007 balance sheet data from the Business Registry covering the population of firms required to file their
(unconsolidated) accounts to the National Bank of Belgium (nbb). The data combine annual accounts
with data from the Crossroads Bank on firms’ main sector, activity and legal status. Overall, most firms
that are registered in Belgium (i.e., that exist as a separate legal entity) and have limited liability are
required to file annual accounts.24 Specifically, all limited-liability firms that are incorporated in Belgium
24Exceptions include: sole traders; small companies whose members have unlimited liability; general partnerships;
ordinary limited partnerships; cooperative limited liability companies; large companies whose members have unlimited
liability, if none of the members is a legal entity; public utilities; agricultural partnerships; hospitals, unless they have
taken the form of a trading company with limited liability; health insurance funds; professional associations; schools and
higher education institutions.
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have to report unconsolidated accounts involving balance sheet items and income statements. Belgian
firms that are in addition part of a group also have to submit consolidated accounts where they report
the joint group’s activities in a consolidated way. However, Belgian affiliates of a foreign group which
do not exist as a separate legal entity in Belgium are not required to report unconsolidated accounts
(they are required to file a consolidated account, but these data do not allow us to obtain firm-level
characteristics for the Belgian affiliate). There are two types of annual accounts: full and abbreviated.
Firms have to file a full annual account when they exceed at least two of the three following cutoffs:
(i) employ at least 50 employees; (ii) have an annual turnover of more than 7.3 million euros; and
(iii) report total assets of more than 3.65 million euros.
For the 2008S1–2009S1 (2007S1–2008S1) analysis, we selected those companies that either filed a
full or an abbreviated balance sheet in 2007 (2006) while reporting at least one employee. Annualized
balance sheets provide us with information on the (full-time equivalent) number of employees, operating
profits, equity and liability values, the amount of liabilities due after or within one year, the amount
of liabilities held by financial institutions or commercial parties, the values of intermediate stocks, and
the NACE rev1.1 5-digit code of the firm. Data on firm turnover, value added, purchased intermedi-
ates, and investments in 2006 and 2007 come from mandatory VAT declarations provided by the nbb.
Balance sheets also record information on these four variables, but we prefer to use VAT declarations
as information is more accurate and virtually covers the universe of Belgian firms. Multinational status
and foreign ownership of a firm come from the yearly Survey of Foreign Direct Investments carried out
by the nbb. Finally, firm-level imports and exports, which are needed to construct some firm-level con-
trols, refer to the same year of the balance sheet information. Data have been obtained by aggregating
firm-product-country level transaction values in the trade database over the entire year at the firm level.
Trade and production data. Import and export data by firm, product, and country for Belgium
is collected by the nbb on a monthly basis. More precisely, the information comes from intra-EU
(Intrastat) and extra-EU (Extrastat) trade declarations that cover the universe of trade transactions.25
Firm and trade data were merged using the VAT number which identifies each firm in Belgium. The
data is extremely rich and comparable in quality to the widely known French Customs data used by,
e.g., Eaton et al. (2004). Imports and exports of each firm are recorded in current euros at the 8-digit
CN level by country of origin/destination.26 Information on either the number of units or the weight in
kilograms (or sometimes both) of traded goods is available and is product specific. Weight is the most
widely used quantity unit.
In order to construct the quantity index used in Tables 2 to 3 we have use a ‘mixed quantity’ unit
corresponding to kilograms, whenever recorded, and to units for those products recorded in units only.
25For intra-EU trade, the thresholds above which a legal obligation to declare arises are relatively small. In addition
firms often provide information about their trade even when they are below the thresholds. For Extra-EU trade data are
exhaustive for trade flows over 1,000 euros or 1,000 kilograms.
26The 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN) is the main product classification in the European Community. It is an
product-based classification that draws extensively on the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature.
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We then compute the average mixed quantity value across all firm-country-product triples involved in
the group considered (example: exports of small firms) separately for 2008 and 2009. We define the
average price as the ratio of the average value of trade triples across all firm-country-products involved in
the group considered and the average mixed quantity defined above. As long as the composition of trade
is stable across goods recorded in kilograms and in units, our indicators are informative about average
changes in prices and quantities traded. To check robustness, we have also computed a quantity and a
price index following the same methodology described above while considering only trade registered in
kilograms. Results are very similar in terms of price and quantity changes between 2008S1 and 2009S1.
Finally, monthly production data are provided by the Belgian National Institute of Statistics. Data
are based on mandatory monthly declarations by a sample of about 7,000 firms representing medium
and large manufacturing producers in Belgium. Once anonymized, data are then made available to
the public for different levels of sectoral aggregation under the Prodcom database brand. Some goods,
especially those referring to agriculture and fishery, are not included in the data. In our robustness
analysis, we make use of the firm-level version of the data.
Country and product data. Exchange rate variations between 2008S1 and 2009S1 (as well as
between 2007S1 and 2008S1) refer to the change in the nominal interbank exchange rates with respect
to the euro at noon on April 1st, as recorded by the Bank of Canada. We choose April 1st as our
midpoint in the first semester of each year (April 2nd in 2007). The average growth rate of GDP
between 2008 and 2009 is the average of the two annual growth rates of the GDP at constant prices and
comes from the IMF World Economic Outlook database as of October 2009. A mirror definition applies
to the average growth rate between 2007 and 2008. The product classification follows the EU’s ‘Main
Industrial Groupings’ in official statistics, as described in the European Commission Regulation No
586/2001 (March 26, 2001). This classification separates products into intermediate, capital, consumer
durable, consumer non-durable, and energy products. Some HS4 products (mainly agricultural goods)
cannot be assigned to one of these categories using the correspondence Table provided by the EU; we
thus classify them as ‘Residual goods’. The product group ‘Intermediate, Capital, & Durables’ used in
the paper refers to the grouping of intermediate, capital goods, and consumer durables. All remaining
product categories are subsumed by the ‘Other Goods’ group. The measure of product differentiation
we use is based on the Rauch (1999) classification and corresponds to the share of HS6 codes within an
HS4 category that are neither sold on an organized exchange nor referenced priced. We use the ‘liberal’
classification.
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B Baseline Tables and Figures
Table 1: Percentage changes in total trade by country for the top-100 Belgian trading partners (2008S1–2009S1).
Country Rank % Trade change Country Rank % Trade change Country Rank % Trade change
NL 1 -31.83 AU 35 8.48 CY 69 -35.05
DE 2 -25.16 SA 36 -8.51 EC 70 15.35
FR 3 -25.31 RO 37 -28.39 LV 71 -42.00
GB 4 -27.47 EG 38 -53.49 PE 72 -37.83
IT 5 -26.87 TH 39 -16.16 BY 73 -18.36
US 6 -24.95 QA 40 35.67 LB 74 -1.65
ES 7 -25.68 MX 41 -11.40 CM 75 -4.22
LU 8 -31.10 ID 42 -12.77 GH 76 -18.40
SE 9 -41.33 MA 43 -31.07 CI 77 -2.92
IN 10 -32.49 TW 44 -14.58 SN 78 -49.34
CN 11 0.17 DZ 45 -1.61 SY 79 -16.80
JP 12 -23.78 UA 46 -37.26 SR 80 29.04
RU 13 -48.98 CD 47 -44.41 LY 81 14.89
PL 14 -23.40 VN 48 -31.80 DO 82 -50.12
NO 15 -39.12 AR 49 -36.59 JO 83 19.55
CH 16 -17.45 SG 50 -17.06 LS 84 -20.78
IL 17 -58.66 MY 51 -20.06 KW 85 21.52
TR 18 -33.78 SI 52 -21.13 LK 86 -22.96
CZ 19 -20.87 TN 53 -14.73 IS 87 -26.81
AT 20 -22.34 LT 54 -16.11 NC 88 -23.43
AE 21 -40.51 VE 55 -44.57 KE 89 -16.37
DK 22 -25.31 MH 56 -99.99 ZM 90 -28.98
KR 23 -36.82 IR 57 -22.45 CG 91 -24.93
BR 24 -34.73 PH 58 -31.52 GN 92 -6.82
IE 25 21.50 NZ 59 -2.26 MT 93 -22.05
FI 26 -25.84 NG 60 -32.34 SL 94 -39.26
PT 27 -25.03 AO 61 12.90 MR 95 -66.38
HK 28 -9.84 CL 62 36.79 HN 96 -22.24
CA 29 -21.86 PK 63 -8.21 BF 97 22.24
HU 30 -25.83 CO 64 12.48 KZ 98 -10.38
ZA 31 -25.33 BD 65 8.31 MK 99 -57.05
GR 32 -31.16 EE 66 -32.95 BJ 100 -21.04
BG 33 -46.43 HR 67 -37.08
SK 34 -23.24 CR 68 -9.35
Notes: Total trade is measured as exports plus imports. Country codes are given in the ISO2 format. Countries
are ranked according to their total trade with Belgium in the first semester of 2008.
Table 2: Changes in the margins of total Belgian exports and imports (2008S1–2009S1).
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
Total exports (all firm-country-product combinations)
2008 S1 101.25 18,053 6.62 5.58 151,844 115,277 1.32
2009 S1 74.69 18,227 6.49 5.59 112,925 92,221 1.22
(∆− 1)% -26.23 0.96 -1.92 0.16 -25.63 -20.00 -7.04
Margin’s contribution 2.68% 97.32%
Total imports (all firm-country-product combinations)
2008 S1 106.10 31,497 3.88 7.02 123,681 118,747 1.04
2009 S1 76.64 33,576 3.74 6.78 89,855 98,089 0.92
(∆− 1)% -27.77 6.60 -3.54 -3.32 -27.35 -17.40 -12.05
Margin’s contribution 1.79% 98.21%
Notes: Total imports are given in billion euros while average sales are given in euros. See Appendix A.
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Table 3: Changes in the margins of Belgian exports and imports, by subgroupings (2008S1–2009S1).
Total Extensive margin Intensive margin Sales[1]
Subgroup of firms and transactions % change Firms Countries Products Contrib. Sales Contrib. Quantities Prices
Product classifications[2]
Exports class. as ‘Other goods’ -21.03 1.09 -1.35 -0.52 3.39% -20.39 96.61% -11.29 -10.26
Exports class. as ‘Interm., Capital, & Dura.’ -28.98 1.32 -2.60 0.50 2.40% -28.40 97.60% -24.10 -5.66
Imports class. as ‘Other goods’ -25.64 6.42 -1.94 -3.96 -0.77% -25.80 100.77% -11.02 -16.61
Imports class. as ‘Interm., Capital, & Dura.’ -29.17 5.36 -3.18 -3.03 3.14% -28.40 96.86% -23.45 -6.46
Regional components
Exports to eu member states only -26.06 1.43 -3.07 0.00 5.62% -24.79 94.38% -19.23 -6.88
Exports to oecd non-eu countries -27.70 1.32 -1.68 4.18 -11.43% -30.33 111.43% -34.94 7.09
Exports to non-oecd non-eu countries -26.22 0.68 -0.93 0.32 -0.20% -26.27 100.20% -10.96 -17.19
Firm types[3]
Exports by small firms -20.52 -2.44 1.14 2.31 -4.13% -21.27 104.13% -23.96 3.54
Exports by large firms -27.35 0.72 -2.86 3.46 -3.82% -28.23 103.82% -23.44 -6.25
Imports by small firms -12.80 1.51 0.30 -0.59 -8.76% -13.84 108.76% -10.31 -3.93
Imports by large firms -30.46 0.62 -1.40 -2.02 7.79% -28.46 92.21% -16.48 -14.35
Ownership structure[4]
Imports by non-multinational firms -23.34 1.92 -1.40 -2.12 6.17% -22.07 93.83% -15.80 -7.45
Imports by multinational firms -36.61 2.14 -1.84 -3.64 7.58% -34.38 92.42% -17.48 -20.49
Imports by non-foreign-owned firms -19.91 2.06 -1.45 -2.41 8.35% -18.41 91.65% -10.31 -9.03
Imports by foreign-owned firms -34.57 -0.45 0.16 -1.55 4.36% -33.35 95.64% -22.46 -14.04
Debt structure[5]
Exports, low share of debts over liabilities -24.53 0.27 -1.36 3.08 -6.91% -25.98 106.91% -23.25 -3.56
Exports, high share of debts over liabilities -29.72 -1.55 -1.06 0.68 5.52% -28.34 94.48% -21.78 -8.39
Exports, low share of financial debts -24.25 -0.70 -0.72 2.27 -2.95% -24.87 102.95% -21.97 -3.72
Exports, high share of financial debts -29.36 -0.72 -1.44 2.01 0.53% -29.23 99.47% -23.21 -7.84
Firm dynamics:
Stayers, entrants, and exiters[6]
Exports of Stayers -26.81 0.00 -1.41 2.16 -2.28% -27.32 102.28%
Imports of Stayers -28.41 0.00 0.33 -2.07 5.26% -27.14 94.74%
Exports of Entrants -77.83 -5.55 -7.67 -34.84 37.52% -60.99 62.48%
Imports of Entrants -76.49 -4.80 -8.45 -14.64 20.43% -68.39 79.57%
Exports of Exiters -77.36 9.16 -2.61 18.27 -8.76% -81.99 108.76%
Imports of Exiters -1.35 69.82 -6.22 -7.74 -2,832.58% -32.86 2,932.58%
Notes: See Section 3 for additional details on the decomposition performed. All figures are expressed in terms of percentage changes. We report results for
both exports and imports only when the results for those two categories are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficiently different. This table presents only
a subset of the results. The full set of results is available as a spreadsheet from the authors upon request.
[1]As a robustness check (available upon request) we also provide an alternative price-quantity decomposition where we only focus on goods which are
reported by weight. Results slightly differ from those reported in the paper. The reasons are that: the total trade of goods that are measured in kilograms
has decreased less than the trade of goods measures in units; and Belgium trades proportionally more goods measured in kilograms with non-eu countries.
[2]The product classification follows the eu’s ‘Main Industrial Groupings’ in official statistics, as described in the European Commission Regulation No
586/2001 (March 26, 2001). This classification separates products into intermediate, capital, consumer durable, consumer non-durable, and energy products.
[3]We define size in terms of employment and small (large) firms as those being below (above) the 2-digit NACE rev1.1 industry median size across all
trading firms. Information on some exporters and importers are lost because of the lack of balance sheet data which is required for figures on employment
and other firm characteristics.
[4]A multinational firm is a firm that is registered in Belgium and which owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 10% of the equity of at least one firm
registered in another country. A foreign-owned firm is a firm that is registered in Belgium and the equity of which is, either directly or indirectly, owned
(partially or in total) by one or more firms registered in another country, with each owing at least 10% of the equity of the Belgian firm.
[5]The ratios are computed from balance sheet information. The share of financial debts is the ratio of financial debts to total liabilities (thus excluding
commercial debt).
[6]Figures refer to percentage difference between cohorts: 2009S1 stayers exported 26.81% less in 2009S1 than did 2008S1 stayers in 2008S1.
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Table 4: The dynamics of exports and imports (2007S1–2009S1).
2008S1–2009S1 trade dynamics
Exports Imports
Firm Type N of firms Trade share in N of firms Trade share in
2009S1 2008S1 2009S1 2008S1
Stayers 12,964 0.98 0.98 23,782 0.98 0.98
Entrants 5,263 0.02 0.00 9,794 0.02 0.00
Exiters 5,089 0.00 0.02 7,715 0.00 0.02
2007S1–2008S1 trade dynamics
Exports Imports
Firm Type N of firms Trade share in N of firms Trade share in
2008S1 2007S1 2008S1 2007S1
Stayers 12,481 0.92 0.92 21,209 0.92 0.98
Entrants 5,572 0.08 0.00 10,288 0.08 0.00
Exiters 4,662 0.00 0.08 4,543 0.00 0.02
Notes: See Appendix A for further details.
Table 5: Firm, country, and product regressors.
Variable name Description
Firm characteristics: 2006 (2007) values
for 2007S1–2008S1 (2008S1–2009S1)
Dsize Size (in term of employment) of the firm
Dprod Value added per worker
Dinterm share Share of intermediates over turnover
Dshare exp sales Share of exports over turnover
Dshare imp interm Share of imports over intermediates
Dvalue add chain Exports times imports over turnover
Dext fin dep Investments minus operating profits over investments
Dshare debts o liab Ratio of debts over total liabilities
Dshare debts due after one Share of debts due after one year
Dshare fin debt Share of financial debt
Dshare stock Ratio of stock over turnover
for Foreign firm dummy
mne Multinational dummy
Ss NACE rev1.1 2-digit dummies
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU Dummy for countries belonging to the oecd (in 2008) but not to the eu
NO OECD NO EU Dummy for countries belonging neither to the oecd nor to the eu
exch rate change % change in the nominal exchange rate with the Euro between the end of the
first quarter of 2007 (2008) and the end of the first quarter of 2008 (2009)
growth rate GDP Average annual growth rate of the country’s GDP between 2007 (2008)
and 2008 (2009)
Product characteristics
intermediates Intermediate goods dummy
capital goods Capital goods dummy
consumer durables Durable consumer goods dummy
consumer non durables Non-durable consumer goods dummy
energy Energy related goods dummy
redidual Goods not belonging to the previous categories
fraclib diff Measure of product differentiation (based on Rauch, 1999)
Notes: All firm characteristics prefixed with a ‘D’ are dummy variables that take value one if the firm characteristic is above
the NACE rev 1.1 2-digit industry median across trading firms and zero otherwise. All data sources and the definitions of
the variables are provided in Appendix A.
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Table 6: Export and import growth – firm, country, and product determinants.
Export growth Import growth
Coefficient Base DD Base DD
Firm characteristics
Dsize 0.0371
b -0.0305 0.0218b 0.0068
(0.018) (0.030) (0.009) (0.015)
Dprod 0.0108 -0.0101 0.0391
a -0.0425a
(0.015) (0.027) (0.009) (0.016)
Dinterm share 0.0032 -0.0194 0.0071 -0.0279
c
(0.016) (0.026) (0.010) (0.015)
Dshare exp sales -0.0087 -0.0239 0.0191 -0.0571
b
(0.023) (0.054) (0.013) (0.025)
Dshare imp interm -0.0511
b 0.0611b -0.0280b 0.0017
(0.021) (0.031) (0.011) (0.014)
Dvalue add chain 0.0309 -0.0148 -0.0507
a 0.0002
(0.027) (0.049) (0.014) (0.033)
Dext fin dep -0.0350 0.0201 -0.0256
b -0.0035
(0.022) (0.027) (0.012) (0.017)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0168 -0.0178 -0.0055 -0.0066
(0.018) (0.030) (0.010) (0.015)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0104 0.0456
c 0.0097 0.0102
(0.021) (0.024) (0.013) (0.017)
Dshare fin debt 0.0209 -0.0668
b 0.0011 -0.0043
(0.022) (0.029) (0.011) (0.019)
Dshare stock 0.0104 0.0234 0.0113 -0.0244
(0.021) (0.030) (0.010) (0.016)
for 0.0181 -0.0444 0.0029 0.0087
(0.026) (0.041) (0.014) (0.029)
mne 0.0114 -0.0255 -0.0304 0.0309
(0.029) (0.038) (0.023) (0.037)
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU -0.1561a 0.2790a -0.2988a 0.4841a
(0.021) (0.051) (0.037) (0.055)
NO OECD NO EU -0.0742a 0.1013c -0.2255a 0.3854a
(0.028) (0.053) (0.042) (0.067)
exch rate change -0.2885a -0.1769c -0.2988a 0.2463b
(0.071) (0.091) (0.086) (0.101)
growth rate GDP 0.0138a 0.0115b 0.0056 0.0008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Product characteristics
intermediates 0.0126 -0.0485c -0.0246 -0.0334c
(0.013) (0.029) (0.015) (0.018)
capital goods -0.0055 -0.0746c -0.0393 -0.0218
(0.020) (0.043) (0.031) (0.037)
consumer durables -0.0171 -0.1135a -0.0305 -0.0568c
(0.030) (0.044) (0.023) (0.033)
energy 0.0944b -0.1324c -0.0409 0.0387
(0.041) (0.075) (0.065) (0.063)
residual 0.0150 -0.0579 -0.0572b 0.0239
(0.024) (0.043) (0.026) (0.022)
fraclib diff -0.0347
b 0.0519b -0.0255b 0.0497a
(0.013) (0.024) (0.012) (0.013)
NACE dummies Yes Yes
Observations 400,626 506,114
R2 0.0104 0.0091
Notes: The column ‘Base’ refers to coefficients of firm, country, and product
characteristics alone, while the column ‘DD’ refers to coefficients of interactions
of these characteristics with the trade collapse treatment time dummy TCt.
Multi-level clustered standard errors following Cameron et al. (2011) are given
in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table 7: Correlations of 2007 firm-level variables.
Dsize 1
Dprod 0.00 1
Dinterm share -0.01 -0.02 1
Dshare exp sales 0.10 0.10 0.00 1
Dshare imp interm 0.08 0.10 -0.12 0.20 1
Dvalue add chain 0.37 0.17 0.07 0.44 0.32 1
Dext fin dep -0.03 -0.34 0.11 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 1
Dshare debts o liab -0.06 -0.10 0.15 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.13 1
Dshare debts due after one 0.00 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.16 0.22 1
Dshare fin debt 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.52 1
Dshare stock -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.15 0.22 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.10 1
for 0.21 0.27 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.21 -0.16 -0.04 -0.20 -0.14 -0.13 1
mne 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.19 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.43 1
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Table 8: Changes in firm-level exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios.
Changes in Changes in
exports-to-turnover imports-to-intermediates
Coefficient Base DD Base DD
Dsize 0.0936
a -0.1020c 0.0502a -0.0859a
(0.032) (0.052) (0.019) (0.032)
Dprod 0.0557
c -0.0525 0.0263 0.0138
(0.030) (0.050) (0.018) (0.029)
Dinterm share 0.0442 -0.0150 0.0583
a -0.0710b
(0.027) (0.044) (0.017) (0.028)
Dshare exp sales -0.1290
a -0.0188 -0.0116 0.0657
(0.031) (0.050) (0.030) (0.050)
Dshare imp interm 0.0012 0.0219 -0.0187 -0.0978
a
(0.029) (0.049) (0.016) (0.027)
Dvalue add chain -0.0561 -0.0445 0.0209 -0.0953
b
(0.036) (0.058) (0.029) (0.048)
Dext fin dep -0.0826
a 0.0654 0.0089 -0.0455
(0.029) (0.048) (0.017) (0.029)
Dshare debts o liab 0.0225 -0.0297 -0.0110 0.0056
(0.028) (0.046) (0.017) (0.029)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0513
c -0.0570 0.0108 -0.0150
(0.030) (0.048) (0.018) (0.032)
Dshare fin debt -0.0260 -0.0129 -0.0031 0.0423
(0.030) (0.049) (0.019) (0.032)
Dshare stock 0.0372 -0.0105 0.0106 0.0060
(0.027) (0.044) (0.017) (0.028)
for -0.0986b 0.0872 -0.0360 0.1283b
(0.047) (0.071) (0.030) (0.056)
mne 0.0813c -0.1055 0.0350 -0.0432
(0.044) (0.072) (0.036) (0.061)
NACE dummies Yes Yes
Observations 16,610 28,371
R2 0.0177 0.0103
Notes: The column ‘Base’ refers to coefficients of firm characteristics alone, while
the column ‘DD’ refers to coefficients of interactions of these characteristics with the
trade collapse treatment time dummy TCt. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Figure 1: Monthly exports and imports (million euros).
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Figure 2: Percentage changes in exports and imports, by broad product category (2008S1–2009S1).
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Figure 3: Percentage changes in exports, imports, and ratios to production by product (2008S1–2009S1).
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Figure 4: Monthly export-to-production and import-to-production value ratios.
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Notes: Export and imports are considered only for those goods for which data on production is available from the Prodcom dataset.
Figure 5: Non-linearities in the marginal effects of GDP growth on export growth.
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Notes: The ‘concave’ curve (∆) depicts pre-treatment coefficients, while the ‘convex’ curve (◦) represents post-treatment coefficients.
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C Tables for robustness checks
Table 9: Export and import growth – firm, country, and product determinants (weighted least squares).
Exports growth Imports growth
Coefficient Base DD Base DD
Firm characteristics
Dsize 0.0320
c -0.0272 0.0189c 0.0048
(0.018) (0.029) (0.010) (0.016)
Dprod 0.0208 -0.0219 0.0409
a -0.0498a
(0.017) (0.023) (0.010) (0.016)
Dinterm share 0.0098 -0.0372
c 0.0030 -0.0199
(0.015) (0.022) (0.009) (0.015)
Dshare exp sales 0.0039 -0.0104 0.0088 -0.0619
b
(0.021) (0.031) (0.014) (0.025)
Dshare imp interm -0.0505
a 0.0518b -0.0241a 0.0025
(0.016) (0.024) (0.009) (0.015)
Dvalue add chain 0.0260 -0.0177 -0.0471
a 0.0013
(0.024) (0.034) (0.015) (0.024)
Dext fin dep -0.0312 0.0257 -0.0319
a 0.0020
(0.020) (0.025) (0.010) (0.016)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0169 -0.0185 -0.0080 -0.0100
(0.018) (0.027) (0.010) (0.015)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0138 0.0413
b 0.0096 0.0163
(0.015) (0.020) (0.011) (0.018)
Dshare fin debt 0.0113 -0.0675
a 0.0015 -0.0139
(0.018) (0.023) (0.012) (0.019)
Dshare stock 0.0113 0.0092 0.0160
c -0.0256c
(0.016) (0.023) (0.009) (0.015)
for 0.0086 -0.0442 -0.0038 0.0031
(0.022) (0.033) (0.015) (0.027)
mne 0.0079 -0.0065 -0.0346c 0.0296
(0.027) (0.035) (0.021) (0.032)
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU -0.1271a 0.1974a -0.2443a 0.3591a
(0.018) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032)
NO OECD NO EU -0.0521b 0.0275 -0.1644a 0.2775a
(0.024) (0.035) (0.028) (0.039)
exch rate change -0.3061a -0.1648b -0.3057a 0.2405b
(0.066) (0.081) (0.082) (0.108)
growth rate GDP 0.0120a 0.0125a 0.0042 0.0030
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Product characteristics
intermediates 0.0026 -0.0702a -0.0295a -0.0453a
(0.013) (0.020) (0.010) (0.015)
capital goods -0.0069 -0.1045a -0.0585a -0.0306
(0.020) (0.031) (0.013) (0.020)
consumer durables -0.0393 -0.1167a -0.0194 -0.0605b
(0.032) (0.044) (0.015) (0.024)
energy 0.0897b -0.1403b 0.0145 -0.0533
(0.041) (0.070) (0.050) (0.073)
residual -0.0021 -0.0655c -0.0705a 0.0204
(0.024) (0.034) (0.016) (0.024)
fraclib diff -0.0484
a 0.0615a -0.0555a 0.0563a
(0.012) (0.018) (0.008) (0.012)
NACE dummies Yes Yes
Observations 400,626 506,114
R2 0.0138 0.0119
Notes: Estimates using weighted least squares. The column ‘Base’ refers to
coefficients of firm, country, and product characteristics alone, while the column
‘DD’ refers to coefficients of interactions of these characteristics with the trade
collapse treatment time dummy TCt . Firm-level clustered standard errors are
given in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table 10: Changes in firm-level exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios (weighted least squares).
Changes in Changes in
exports-to-turnover imports-to-intermediates
Coefficient Base DD Base DD
Dsize 0.0878
a -0.1000c 0.0472a -0.0817a
(0.031) (0.051) (0.018) (0.031)
Dprod 0.0522
c -0.0523 0.0234 0.0192
(0.029) (0.049) (0.017) (0.028)
Dinterm share 0.0436 -0.0165 0.0529
a -0.0617b
(0.027) (0.043) (0.016) (0.027)
Dshare exp sales -0.1267
a -0.0114 -0.0088 0.0637
(0.030) (0.049) (0.028) (0.047)
Dshare imp interm 0.0065 0.0204 -0.0183 -0.0894
a
(0.028) (0.047) (0.016) (0.026)
Dvalue add chain -0.0601
c -0.0435 0.0203 -0.0947b
(0.036) (0.058) (0.027) (0.046)
Dext fin dep -0.0839
a 0.0666 0.0091 -0.0441
(0.028) (0.047) (0.017) (0.028)
Dshare debts o liab 0.0216 -0.0298 -0.0114 0.0071
(0.027) (0.044) (0.017) (0.028)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0525
c -0.0604 0.0084 -0.0119
(0.029) (0.047) (0.018) (0.031)
Dshare fin debt -0.0211 -0.0186 -0.0013 0.0384
(0.029) (0.047) (0.018) (0.031)
Dshare stock 0.0379 -0.0094 0.0095 0.0073
(0.026) (0.042) (0.016) (0.027)
for -0.1043b 0.1021 -0.0364 0.1268b
(0.047) (0.070) (0.029) (0.055)
mne 0.0802c -0.0999 0.0342 -0.0396
(0.044) (0.071) (0.035) (0.058)
NACE dummies Yes Yes
Observations 16,610 28,371
R2 0.0183 0.0098
Notes: Estimates using weighted least squares. The column ‘Base’ refers to coefficients
of firm characteristics alone, while the column ‘DD’ refers to coefficients of interactions
of these characteristics with the trade collapse treatment time dummy TCt . Robust
standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table 11: Changes in firm-level exports-to-production and imports-to-production ratios.
Exports to Imports to
Production change Production change
Coefficient Base DD Base DD
Dsize -0.0636 0.2204
b 0.1526a -0.1889b
(0.060) (0.088) (0.051) (0.083)
Dprod -0.0256 0.0444 0.0310 -0.0140
(0.041) (0.060) (0.032) (0.049)
Dinterm share 0.0647
c -0.0309 -0.0632b 0.0878c
(0.036) (0.055) (0.030) (0.047)
Dshare exp sales -0.1142
a 0.0999 0.0367 -0.0120
(0.042) (0.069) (0.042) (0.066)
Dshare imp interm 0.0339 0.0340 0.0352 -0.0807
c
(0.037) (0.063) (0.027) (0.045)
Dvalue add chain -0.0947
b -0.0763 0.0242 -0.0357
(0.046) (0.074) (0.046) (0.070)
Dext fin dep -0.0261 -0.0557 0.0280 -0.0622
(0.040) (0.060) (0.032) (0.048)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0283 0.0394 -0.0227 -0.0406
(0.037) (0.059) (0.031) (0.049)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0133 0.0732 0.0500 -0.0287
(0.039) (0.061) (0.035) (0.054)
Dshare fin debt -0.0193 -0.0011 -0.0271 0.0354
(0.040) (0.062) (0.034) (0.055)
Dshare stock 0.0170 0.0164 -0.0464 0.0458
(0.035) (0.057) (0.030) (0.046)
for 0.0328 0.0127 -0.0444 0.1115c
(0.040) (0.060) (0.035) (0.057)
mne 0.0243 -0.1167c 0.0008 -0.0496
(0.036) (0.066) (0.031) (0.055)
NACE dummies Yes Yes
Observations 5,012 5,939
R2 0.0255 0.0322
Notes: The column ‘Base’ refers to coefficients of firm characteristics alone, while
the column ‘DD’ refers to coefficients of interactions of these characteristics with the
trade collapse treatment time dummy TCt. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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